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Family Choice:
An Idea Whose Time
Has Come and Gone?
James J. Fishman
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University; Past
Associate Dean, Pace University School of Law;
A.B., A.M., University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D.,
J.D., New York University.

But to go to school in a summer morn
Oh! it drives all joy away;
Under a cruel eye outworn,
The little ones spend the day,
In sighing and dismay.
WILLIAM
BLAKE'

I. Introduction

EDUCATIONAL
VOUCHERS are written or authorized certificates
issued by a unit of government. They provide parents with the
authorization to pay for their child's education at the school of
their choice. Under a voucher system, parents choose schools
according to their beliefs about the type of education they desire
for their child and their perception of an individual school's quality. The school redeems the voucher by sending or returning it to
the government unit in return for a predetermined dollar amount.
Under this system, government support of education flows only to
those schools to which parents have decided to send their ~ h i l d r e n . ~
The heart of the criticism of the existing educational system is
the feeling that public schools no longer meet the needs of society,
educational bureaucracies account to no one, parents have little
say or choice in the educational options for their children, there is
little diversity in public schools, and the public school establish1. The School Boy, in THEPOETRY
AND PROSE
OF WILLIAM
BLAKE
(Erdman ed.
1965).
2. C. MCGUIRE,
EDUCATIONAL
VOUCHERS
1 (June 19, 1979) (report prepared
for the New York State Task Force on Equity and Excellence in Education).

Heinonline - - 15 Urb. Law. 113 1983

ment has resisted any attempts at reform or distributing data that
could be used to challenge the present system.'
The breadth of disquiet with the public schools is demonstrated
by the exodus of whites from public schools, the increasing retreat
of the middle class to private schools, and a long-term trend of
middle class black and white movement to the suburb^.^ Dissatisfaction with education is exemplified by attempts to place a
cap on public expenditures, the Proposition 13 mentality, the
declining enrollment and support for public school systems and
school budgets, and the turmoil of court-ordered integration.
These factors have led to a search for alternatives to the existing
public educational system and a serious interest in the voucher
alternative.
Although vouchers have been used only in a few instances, such
as providing educational possibilities for handicapped students,
the educational voucher is not a new idea.5 Its underlying philosophical basis is the advantage of a free-market economy and
individual choice in achieving quality education. The voucher is an
eighteenth century idea and first appeared in Adam Smith's Wealth
of nation^.^ Smith believed if teachers' creativity and energy were
put to the test, they would stimulate the market, more efficient
teaching would result and teachers would prosper. The choice of a
school by parents would trigger a subsidy from the government to
the school.'
Thomas Paine, another early voucher proponent, specifically
suggested giving lower class families the opportunity for schooling
through a negative income tax scaled progressively in favor of the
poor. Paine believed that his plan would: (1) be easy to implement; (2) insure competition among schools; and (3) decentralize
3. Areen & Jencks, Educational Vouchers: A Proposal for Diversiv and
Choice, 72 TCHRS.C. REC. 327, 328-29 (1972); J. COONS& S. SUGARMAN,
EDUCATION
BY CHOICE:
THECASEFOR FAMILY
CONTROL
19-20 (1978) [hereinafter
& SUGARMAN];
LaNoue, The Politics of Education, 73 TCHRS.
C.
cited as COONS
REC.304 (1971).
4. COO&, 0f~ a m i Choice
l~
and Public Education, 61 PHIDELTAKAPPAN
10
(1979).
5 . See Rebell, Educational Voucher Reform Empirical Insights from the Experience of New York's Schools for the Handicapped, 14 URB.LAW.441 (Summer,
1982). The G.I. Bill, 38 U.S.C. 8 1651 (Supp. I11 1980), was a federal attempt to
use vouchers for higher education. Higher education has never had the same
community and government support as primary and secondary education.
6. 340 (Great Books ed. 1952).
7. COONS& SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 20-34.
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control of education, countering prevailing desires of aristocrats to
maintain their power by depending on i g n ~ r a n c e . ~
Another great eighteenth century thinker, Milton Friedman,
revived interest in voucher plans by proposing that parents be
given a voucher equal to the cost of educating their child.g All
schools, public and private, would charge tuition on a per capita
basis. Schools would compete to attract students. The government's role in education would be limited to the distribution of
vouchers and the imposition of minimum education standards.I0
Friedman's plan involves a completely unregulated voucher system. Wealthier parents could pay tuition amounts over the government voucher. The outcome would be an educational system more
segregated along economic lines. Poorer families would not have
the ability to supplement their vouchers. Under Friedman's plan,
the schools could set their own admission policies and could systematically exclude minorities."
In recent years, other voucher proposals have appeared.12 In
1970, the Center for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) received a
grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity and conducted a
study of voucher pos~ibilities!~
The CSPP proposal applied only to
public schools and was based upon the belief that it would assist
minority children and provide parents with greater diversity of
choice. While several school systems considered the CSPP model,
only the Alum Rock School District in East San Jose, California,
agreed to implement a federally funded voucher experiment in
1972 based upon the CSPP model. The school district had approximately 14,000 students and twenty-one schools. The experiment
did not involve private schools, and its results were mixed!4
8. West, Thomas Paine's Voucher Scheme for Public Education, 33 S. ECON.J.
378 (1967).
AND
9. See M. Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in CAPITALISM
FREEDOM
85 (1962).
supra note 2, at 3.
10. MCGUIRE,
11. Id. at 4.
12. See Sizer & Whitten, A Proposal for a Poor Children's Bill of Rights, 5
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY
58 (1968); Coleman, Toward Open Schools, PUB.INTEREST,
Fall 1967, at 20; Arons, Equity, Option, and Vouchers, 72 TCHRS.
C. REC.337
supra note 2, at 2-6.
(1971); MCGUIRE,
13. CENTER
FOR THE STUDYOF PUBLIC
POLICY,
A PRELIMINARY
REPORT
ON
FINANCING
EDUCA~O
BYNPAYMENTS
TO PARENTS
(1970); see also Areen and
Jencks, supra note 3.
14. Levinson, The Alum Rock Voucher Demonstration: Three Years of Implementation (1976) (Rand Corp. Report No. P5631); Taylor, Educational
Vouchers: Addressing the Establishment Clause Issue, 11 PAC.L.J. 1011, 1064
supra note 3, at 216.
(1979); COONS& SUGARMAN,
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The most persistent, sophisticated, and persuasive proponents
of educational vouchers have been John Coons and Stephen Sugarman, who previously had laid the intellectual foundation for the
equal educational financing of public schools," which resulted in
the Serrano v. Priest6 decision holding that financing public
schools on the basis of the local property tax was an unconstitutional violation of the fourteenth amendment and parallel
clauses in the California Constitution. More recently they have
been advocates for the California Initiative, an attempt to place a
referendum in support of educational vouchers on the ballot in
California. Because of the care and conceptual richness of Coons
and Sugarman's voucher concept, I will analyze educational
vouchers through the prism of their proposal.
Under Coons and Sugarman's voucher concept, the "Family
Choice in Education Plan," the family exercises the choice. The
essence of their voucher concept is:

. . . that each year there are to be provided to each school-age child in the
experimental area(s) a scholarship certificate entitling the child to education in
public or private school of its family choice; that the child himself as he gains
maturity, will be given increased formal power over the choice made; that
families will not face significant schooling costs above the value of the scholarship (for example, no added tuition); that participating schools will be
approved by the government, but requirements for approval will be limited
largely to concern safety, fraud, and minimum educational inputs; that an
effective information and counseling service will be provided to assist the
family in making an informed choice; that subject to space availability, children
will be admitted to schools of their choice, with admissions by a state conducted
lottery when there is excess demand for a particular school; that adequate
transport will be given free; and that the present population of teachers will be
given substantial job protection in the transition years."
Originally, a model in the Family Choice Education Act (FCEA) it
eliminated family wealth as an influence i.lpnn the size of the
Within limits the original FCEA made the size of the
voucher vary according to the judgment of the family itself rather
than of government alone. A family would make some contribu-

15. J. COONS,W. CLUNE,AND S. SUGARMAN,
PRIVATE
WEALTHAND PUBLIC
EDUCATION
(1970).
16. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
s~ SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 31-32. Coon's and Sugarman's views
17. COONS
have changed over the years but the quoted passage is the essence of their
program.
18. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System
for Vouchers, 59 CAL.L. REV.321, 329 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Coons &
Sugarman, Family Choice in Education].
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tion out of its own wealth towards the support of education.lgThe
initial proposal created a variety of schools at which tuition levels
differed. Parents could choose the kind of school they would like
to send their children to, based on educational expenditures. The
advantages claimed for the FCEA plan are that it would create a
new educational market offering of diverse schooling at differing
levels of per-pupil costs; it would place a ceiling on a family's
educational cost; it would benefit poor families through an increased voucher amount; the local property tax for education
would cease; and family choice would benefit good schools and
penalize poor ones.20
Other benefits claimed by Coons and Sugarman's plan included: (1) neutralization of the effects bearing on wealth through
power eq~alization;~'
(2) decisional power would be vested in the
family unit rather than a board of education; (3) the purchasing of
educational goods and services would be accomplished with
greater efficiency; (4) accountability through ease of transfer from
school to school would increase and enable parents to exercise fate
(5) education would be independent of spending
over
from a tax referendum; (6) variety in the style and content of
education would increase;23(7) greater experimentation would be
encouraged; and (8) real community control would result and
racial integration would be promoted.24
In 1979 when Coons attempted to place a Family Choice in
Education proposal on the ballot in California (the California
I n i t i a t i ~ e )he
, ~took
~ advantage of California political winds against
increased government, the level of taxation and public spending,
and the climate against court ordered racial integration. Coons and
Sugarman changed their plan to bring it in line with the political
realities of 1980. Thus, power equalization is gone. Educational
expenditures were limited to 1979-1980 levels; per-pupil cost in
19. Fundamental to the original Coons and Sugarman proposal was that: (1)
the quality of publicly financed education would not be a function of wealth other
than the wealth of the state as a whole; and (2) above an adequate minimum
expenditure per pupil required by law, families might be permittted to choose
among dollar levels of educational offerings. Id. at 329.
20. Id. at 330.
21. Id. at 336. Power equalization is uniformity of capacity to spend for
something such as education.
22. Id. at 337.
23. Id. at 339.
24. Id. at 339-40.
25. An Initiative for Family Choice in Education (1980) [hereinafter cited as
California Initiative].

Heinonline - - 15 Urb. Law. 117 1983

public schools was limited to 90 percent of that of private schools;26
and appropriations for administration of the State Department of
Education were limited to one half of 1percent of the total cost of
educati~n.~'
In an economic sense, the California Initiative offered
a nineteenth century liberal ticket.
Both private and parochial schools could participate in the
voucher plans.28The California Initiative established three classes
of schools: public, independent and family choice;29and it enabled
parents to redeem vouchers at private schools and at a new category of independent public schools which were governed by a
combination of parents, teachers, trustees and others.30The public
schools would continue to exist and parents would not receive
vouchers for attendance at them." The California Constitution
would be modified to eliminate property taxes as the major vehicle
of funding elementary and secondary education.32None of the
three classes of schools could accept or charge tuition over and
above the voucher fee," although educational costs could differ. A
private school participating in the program could limit its
e n r ~ l l m e n tgiving
, ~ ~ priority to present students and their siblings,
and limit attendance to boys or girls." Beyond that, schools would
have to admit any applicant regardless of race, creed or scholastic
a ~ h i e v e m e n tIf. ~there
~ were too many applicants, admission would
be determined by 10ttery.~'Free transportation would be provided
within limitations as provided by the l e g i ~ l a t u r eThe
. ~ ~ California
Initiative did not obtain the necessary signatures for placement on
the California ballot in 1980, but supporters will resume the petition drive for the 1984 ballot.39

26. Id. at 9 15.
27. Id. at Q 5.
28. Id. at Q 13.
29. Id. at Q 6.
30. Id. at Q 10.
31. Id. at 9 6.
32. Id. at 9 l(b).
33. Id. at 9 14.
34. Id. at Q 15.
35. Id. at 8 7.
36. Id. at $0 2, l(g).
37. Id. at 9 7.
38. Id. (obviously a canard to anti-busing proponents).
39. Hoachlander, Financing Public Education in the Wake of Federal and State
Spending Cuts: Crisis and Opportunities, 15 URB.LAW. 148 n.27 (Fall, 1982).
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11. Philosophical Roots of Family Choice

Unlike many reformers, Coons and Sugarman have come armed
with a full philosophical system underlying their proposals. From a
philosophical perspective, they are grounded in the idealism of the
eighteenth century that believed in the perfectibility of man. They
establish two ideal types of persons that can be produced by
educational systems: "conditioned" man versus "autonomous"
man.
Autonomy is
the full development of the child's latent capacity for independent reflection
and for judgment on issues of personal morality and social justice; it is the link
between intellect and responsible action. The perception or moral possibility is
humanity's principal distinction among the company of Earth.40

The alternative to autonomous man is "conditioned man," an
individual taught to believe in and to do good as his teachers view
it." "Conditioned man" is the product of our current educational
systems. The roots of the idea of "autonomous" man can be traced
back to Plato7scitizen of the ideal state, a position achievable by
very few.42Plato's elitism has been democratically transformed to
the eighteenth century view that all persons can be trained to be
Coons and Sugarman also have borrowed from John Stuart Mill,
who believed that the government should enforce universal education, but should not provide one. Rather, the government should
give parents the means to obtain the education they select for their
children." "Conditioned man" is straight Mill:
A general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be
exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which
please the predominant power in the government . . . it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body."

Like many reformers, Coons and Sugarman have tunnel vision
about the institution they are trying to change. They place too
much emphasis on the socializing import of education. Any educa40. COONS& SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 40.
41. Id.
42. PLATO,THEREPUBLIC
3 3 7 0 ~G; . SABINE,A HISTORY
OF POLITICAL
THEORY
49-54, 55, 71 (3d ed. 1961).
43. Kalodner, Book Review, 67 CAL. L. REV.1224, 1225 (1979).
44. Miu, On Liberty in THREEESSAYS129 (Oxford ed. 1912).
45. Id. at 130.
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tional system is but a reflection of the larger society. They are not
only revolting against the educational system, but against the
structure of modern life. It is their rejection of the present that
links them to modern radical and reactionary thought. Their conception of conditioned man reminds one of Karl Marx's distinction, particularly found in his earlier writings, between alienated
.~~
man under capitalism and unalienated man under c ~ m m u n i s mIn
the twentieth century we can see analogies to "autonomous" and
"conditioned" man in the work of Herbert M a r ~ u s e . ~ '
While some educational reformers have moved politically to the
left," the political program of Coons and Sugarman is clearly to
the right of the new conservatism, which looks backward to a time
when government was less intrusive and solutions to the problems
seemed more attainable.
111. Family Choice and Family Control

Coons and Sugarman have concluded that the focus of educational
decisionmaking should be in the family itself rather than in the
professional educational b u r e a u c r a ~ yIn
. ~ ~locating the source of
control in the family, Coons and Sugarman return to an eighteenth
century educational approach.'O Families are not what they used to
be. Nor is this a recent development. As Christopher Lasch has
remarked: "The family has slowly come apart for more than 100
years."*' Voucher proponents ignore the importance of the breakdown of the family as a major source of additional burdens upon
the school system and a reason why schools have not fulfilled their
expected roles. Under the present educational system the importance of family background cannot be underestimated in ex. .
p!aln!ng the vcrirtions ef educztiena! a t t a i a m e i ~ tNo
. ~ ~school reform could assist in making adults more equal, for children are
more influenced by what happens at home than by what happens in
46. See generally B. OLLMAN,
ALIENATION:
MARX'SCONCEPTION
OF MANIN
CAPITALIST
SOCIETY
131,232,24748 (1971), G. LICHTHEIM,
MARXISM
44 (1965).
47. Seegenerally H. MARCUSE,
ONEDIMENSIONAL
MAN2 (1964); H. MARCUSE,
AN ESSSAY
ON LIBERATION
(1969).
48. See S. BOWLES
& H. G I N ~ S
SCHOOLING
,
IN CAPITALIST
AMERICA
(1976).
49. COONS& SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 42-54.
AMERICAN
EDUCATION:
THECOLONIAL
EXPERIENCE
160750. See L. CREMIN,
1783, 480-91 (1970).
51. C. LASCH,HAVENIN A HEARTLESS
WORLD:THEFAMILY
BESIEGED
xx
(19791.
' 52.'C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT
OF THE EFFECT
OF FAMILY
AND
SCHOOLING
IN AMERICA
143 (1972).
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The problem of placing the focus of educational decisionmaking in the family is that those most able to make an informed
choice are families that probably have made the best use of existing
educational facilities or have moved their children into private
schools. Can we be so certain that the parents will make the best
judgment in the interest of the
Will poor parents have the
information they need to make an informed choice?55
IV. Competition and the Marketplace

For voucher proponents, the competition of the marketplace will
An imbring educational accountability, quality and di~ersity.'~
portant part of the family choice concept and the California Initiative is the establishment of new schools accomplished with a minimum of regulation and over~ight.~'
Does the marketplace analogy
apply to education? If so, which industries should be the modelairline, automobile, steel, railroad or correspondence and trade
However, it has been suggested that the market analogy is
inappropriate to public education:
Public schools are not a noncompetitive monopoly like the postal service. They
are highly decentralized and they do compete with private schools which enroll
15-35% of the students in most cities and with each other. (There is . . . no
research which shows that public schools are "better" in cities where the
greatest competition with private schools exists. Because of the "drainoff" of
the middle class in these cities . . . the reverse is more likely true.) City schools
also compete against suburban schools and with each other for appropriations,
teachers, special projects, and status as well as in extracurricular a c t i v i t i e ~ . ~ ~

In a time of declining enrollment and uncertainty as to what
approaches really enable children to learn, who will be the entrepreneurs who will bring new schools into e~istence?~"What
kind of
53. Id. at 255.
54. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,242 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
56. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education, supra note 18, at 330.
57. California Initiative, supra note 25, $ 10. Any public agency could establish a not-for-profit corporation, an independent school outside of the present
public school system. A state agency would certify upon proper application an
independent or family choice school, but the state could not increase the curriculum requirements and standards for teaching personnel beyond those in existence
in 1979.
58. LaNoue, The Politics of Education, 73 TCHRS.C. REC.304,313-14 (1971).
59. Id. at 314.
60. Ginzberg, The Economics of the Voucher System, 72 TCHRS.C. REC.373,
379 (1971).
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expertise is required to run a school? Are knowledgeable people
likely to have the start-up capital? The California Initiative provides that family choice schools will only be not-for-profit corporation~.~'
Under the model Family Choice in Education Act,
individual entrepreneurs could open proprietary schools.62The
hustlers and "quick buck" artists rather than the educators may be
drawn into opening new schools. Consumer protection may require increased regulation. As success will be measured by enrollment, education may become vaudeville. Extravagant claims,
heavy advertising and other recruiting techniques will be used.
Instead of promoting quality and diversity, competition may force
schools to offer the lowest common denominator to attract students. Public schools will be forced to charge the lowest possible
tuition and have the least enriched programs, but serve the students with the most expensive educational needs and disabilities.
V. Information: The Marketplace and
Informed Choice

In the educational marketplace will the consumer have adequate
information to make an informed choice? What information is
appropriate? Under the California Initiative, certified schools
would have to disclose information regarding their curricula,
teaching methods, qualifications of teachers and use of resource^.^'
The California Initiative does have provisions assuring parents
adequate information through sources independent of any school
.~~
with special informational needs
or school a ~ t h o r i t y Parents
could obtain vouchers to retain the services of educational couns e l o r ~There
. ~ ~ are no details offered on the nature of the inder\er?der?tsources, the werkings ef the educati~na!c~unse!orgrants
or how funding the information network will be accomplished.
Entrepreneurial educators will provide a surfeit of information
to attract consumers, but if other social programs are any guide,
.~
the poor may not be able to make an informed ~ h o i c e The
61. Generally, a not-for-profit corporation cannot distribute dividends, but it
CORP.LAW§§ 515,
can fix reasonable compensation. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
202 (McKinney 1970).
62. Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education, supra note 18, at 335,
394-95.
63. California Initiative, supra note 25, 5 13.
64. Id. at § 16.
65. Id.
66. See generally Olivas, Information Access Inequities: A Fatal Flaw in Educational Voucher Plans, 10 J . L. & EDUC.441, 453 (1981).
Heinonline - - 15 Urb. Law. 122 1983

socially advantaged individual will have access to more information of educational alternatives compared to the disadvantaged.
Thus, the marketplace may raise the information imperfections
which occur most often among socially disadvantaged groups.'j7'
VI. Promoting Diversity of Schooling
Opportunities through a Voucher Plan

Voucher proponents assume that the public schools exhibit a certain sameness, and that the adoption of a voucher plan would
promote a diversity of educational opportunity that does not now
exist .68
In higher education, where a voucher-type approach through
guaranteed student loans is used to finance education, diversity has
not been promoted. Is there much diversity in private and parochial schools? Accrediting agencies, prestige and the marketplace
all place pressures on schools to conform. Even without government regulation, professional accrediting bodies may intercede to
stifle true diversity and originality. Unfortunately, the marketplace often works against diversity.
Will there be competition or will the educational marketplace
become highly segmented? Elite private schools may not participate in a voucher program. They are already highly attractive.
Their admission policies are often based on exclusivity and they
may fear additional regulation. Parochial schools would participate and would grow somewhat, but as most of the poor and those
remaining in the public schools are Protestant, growth might
quickly reach its limits. The new schools will be competing against
the public schools. A constant criticism of voucher proposals is that
the remaining middle class and academically "normal" students
will depart from the public schools, leaving only the problems. To
some extent this has happened. To accelerate it will not foster
competition, but will increase stratification based on race, class,
religion and on learning or behavioral disabilities.
VII. Administrative Burdens and Financial Expense

Vouchers offer the siren songs of lower education costs, more
efficient use of educational resources and, most attractive, an end
to the educational bureaucracy. Yet as a practical matter, many of
67. Id. at 456.
68. COONS& SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 42.
Heinonline - - 15 Urb. Law. 123 1983

the savings and efficiencies of voucher proposals seem grounded
more in wishfulness than in fact. One must seriously question
whether the administration of vouchers would be less burdensome
than the present educational bureaucracies, and whether a
voucher system would give parents greater input into school and
educational choices than at present. Despite the intent of the
~
system may
California Initiative to limit r e g ~ l a t i o n a, ~voucher
lead to increased regulation of private schools, a reason why many
would not opt to participate. In most states private schools are
regulated leniently, with state concern in terms of certification,
school attendance requirements and requiring nonpublic schools
to meet building, fire, safety and health requirement^.^^ Inevitably,
school certification as proposed under the California Initiative and
the infusion of state funds will lead to more state control of private
education.
The administration of the vouchers themselves would be
cumbersome. The use of existing resources would be inefficient,
for instance, closing or leasing existing schools and equipment, and
the shifting of teaching and administrative personnel. Moreover,
because the idea envisions new schools springing up, they would
not be cost-efficient and would have high start-up costs.71More
schools, each separately run, would lead to a greater percentage of
the budget spent for administrative overhead. The possibilities of
large annual shifts in student population would make planning
difficult if not i m p o s ~ i b l eThe
. ~ ~ administrative savings might be a
mirage; the costs would merely be transferred to each school.
If vouchers are like any other government program (Medicare
and the Guaranteed Student Loan Program are two useful comparisons), substantial state regulation would have to occur to guard
agaiiist fraiid. Abandoning iocai districts might make schoois iess
accountable to parents than they are presently. In the remaining
public schools, the diversity that exists might be ended. If the
voucher proposal is not to discriminate against minorities, greater
69. California Initiative, supra note 25, at § 10.
OF NON-PUBLIC
SCHOOLS:
THE LEGAL
70. See ELSEN,STATEREGULATION
FRAMEWORK
IN PUBLIC
CONTROLS
FOR NON-PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
104 (Erickson ed.
KAPLIN,
DUFFY
& MARGOLIN,
STATE
SCHOOL
AND FAMILY
15,82,84
1969); SORGEN,
(2d ed. 1979).
71. Ginzberg, supra note 60, at 376.
72. The original model statute provided that each January 15 a pupil would
select his school, although a student could switch schools in the middle of the year.
Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education, supra note 18, at 354. See $3 7
and 14 for transfer rights of students in the Initiative.
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regulation than under the present system might be necessary.73
Another problem is the sheer size of many urban school districts."
What may be feasible in a smaller district may become an administrative nightmare and horribly expensive in an urban environment. There will be hidden and not so hidden costs: monitoring
schools-assuming that the accurate information is transmittedand costs of transportation.
The California Initiative provides that the certificate shall reflect
and the common or public schools shall
the costs of transportati~n~~
"transport their pupils in accord with reasonable conditions and
limits upon costs to be fixed by law."76Given the furor over use of
busing to promote racial integration, is it likely that a legislature
will provide sufficient funds to enable the poor, locked in the inner
cities, to transport themselves to schools that in all probability will
not be in their neighborhoods? Transportation is of key importance if a child is to have more than a choice of his neighborhood school. Transportation limits the geographic distance of free
choice. The transportation issue and the drawing of district lines
are difficult and sensitive issues."
VIII. Legal Issues

Coons and Sugarman fail to specifically address the many legal
~
have fared unissues involved in a voucher p r ~ g r a m . 'Vouchers
successfully in the courts in two areas: the use of vouchers to avoid
desegregation and aid to parents who send their children to parochial schools.79
In the early 1960s several southern states enacted legislation
offering tuition grants to parents who sent their children to "private schools." The private schools were segregated and had been
established to avoid dismantling dual school systems. Public
schools were sometimes closed. Use of public funds to maintain

73. Areen & Jencks, supra note 3, at 332.
74. See Dentler, Vouchers: A Problem of Scale 72 TCHRS.C. REC.383, 385
(1971).
75. California Initiative, supra note 25, 5 14.
76. Id. at § 7.
77. Arons, supra note 12, at 355.
78. These points are made by Tractenberg, Some Problems with Family Control, 57 TEX.L. REV.155 (1978) and Taylor, supra note 14, at 1065.
79. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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these private schools was held uncoxistitutional as a violation of the
equal protection clause.s0
Basically, the family choice plan offers freedom of choice. It is
questionable that a voucher plan could be constitutionally introduced in a community that had been under a court-ordered
integration plan. Coons and Sugarman are extremely optimistic
that the voucher system would improve integration:
Integration that occurs by choice is both stable and enduring. Indeed, the only
intelligible meaning of stability is that those involved at the least accept whatever integration has been achie~ed.~'

If the past twenty-five years of attempted school desegregation
have shown anything, it is that whites will migrate to other communities or attend private schools before they will go to school with
blacks.
Freedom-of-choice plans have been found unconstitutional
where there was a dual system previously segregated by law.82
Despite recent efforts by the federal g o ~ e r n m e n ta, ~freedom-of~
choice plan introduced in a school district under a court order to
integrate, or where free choice had been intentionally used to
delay integration, might not pass constitutional muster.84
Freedom of choice works only as an integration device when
there are no other choices. Green v. County School Boardss involved New Kent County in eastern Virginia. About one-half of
the population was black and there was no residential segregation
in the county. The school system had but two schools: the New
Kent School on the east side of the county, which was white, and
the Watkins School on the west side of the county, which was all
80. Griffin v. Countv School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); South Carolina Bd.
Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D. S. Car. 1968), aff 'd per curiam 393 U.S. 222 (1968);
Coffee v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Hall v.
St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'dper curiam
368 U.S. 515 (1962); Hawkins v. North Carolina Bd. Educ., 11 Race Rel. L. Rep.
745 (W.D.N.C. 1966); Lee v. Macon City Bd. Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D.
Ala. 1967); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Asst. Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.
La. 1967), aff'd per curiam 389 U.S. 571 (1978); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin.
Asst. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. La. 1968), aff 'd per curiam 393 U.S. 17
(1968).
- -,
81. COONS& SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 116.
82. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,440-41 (1968); Monroe v. Bd.
of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450,458 (1968); Raney v. Bd. Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
83. U.S. Endorses Chicago's Proposal for Voluntary School Integration N.Y.
TIMES,February 13, 1982 at 1, col. 2.
84. Dayton Bd. Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Keyes v. Denver
School Dist., 413 U.S. 189,202 (1973); United States v. Omaha School Dist., 521
F.2d 530,537 (8th Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 506 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974).
85. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
\--

~
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black. In three years under a freedom-of-choice plan, 115 black
children enrolled in the predominantly white New Kent School,
but 85 percent of the black children in the county still attended the
all-black school. No whites had transferred to the Watkins School.
In the Alum Rock voucher experiment, 80 percent of the children
attended their neighborhood schools.86Thus, even if not constitutionally impermissible, efforts at desegregation would probably come to a halt under the free-choice plan. At best, the burden
of integration would be completely borne by the minority commu-

nit^.^

IX. The Impact of Vouchers on Private and
Parochial Schools-State Action and the End of
Private Schools?

Almost all applications of the fourteenth amendment to private
conduct based on a finding of "state action" have involved an
attack upon private racial discriminati~n.~~
This is particularly true
in the context of educational institutions. Neither the regulation of
educational standards nor tax exemptions has been held to be
sufficient to trigger the state action clause of the fourteenth amend. ~ ~ the addiment against a private educational i n s t i t u t i ~ nGiven
tional administrative and fiscal oversight that will result under a
voucher program, the question arises whether cumulatively this
might involve state actiong0and whether schools that participate in
voucher programs could in any sense be considered private.
X. The Establishment Clause Question

A more difficult issue is whether educational vouchers violate the
establishment clause of the first amendment.91Under the Califor86. See Levinson, supra note 14.
87. California Initiative, supra note 25, at 8 9, provided that no pupil enrollment in a common school shall suffer discrimination on the basis of race, religion
or gender.
88. Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
89. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973);Greenya V.
George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
995 (1975).
90. In Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court
held that tax exemptions, scholarshipsand loans, government support of research
projects, contracts with Philadelphia and the construction, leasing and financing
of buildings were sufficient to demonstrate that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the
university that state action within the meaning of the constitution existed.
91. U.S. CONST.amend. I; see generally Taylor, supra note 14.
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nia Initiative, parochial schools could participate in voucher prog r a m ~Under
. ~ ~ United States Supreme Court decisions, to survive
constitutional scrutiny state aid to a parochial school (1) must have
a secular purpose; (2) must neither advance nor inhibit religion;
and (3) must not foster an excessive entanglement between government and religion.93
In Committee for Public Education v. N y q ~ i s t the
, ~ ~Supreme
Court invalidated a New York statute that provided for direct
money grants from the state to parochial schools to be used for
maintenance and repair of school facilities and equipment. The
Court felt this had the primary effect of advancing religion.95The
Court also held that tuition reimbursement and tax relief limited to
no more than one half of the tuition paid afforded to parents of
children attending elementary or secondary nonpublic schools
violated the establishment clause.%Voucher proponents believe
that aid to parochial schools would survive constitutional attack
because the assistance would be given directly to the parents rather
than to the
Yet, in Public Funds for Public Schools v.
Byme, a New Jersey statute that provided tax deductions to parents of children attending nonpublic schools was held uncon~titutional.~~
Even if a voucher plan could survive the secular
purpose and primary effect standards, it still would have to withstand the excessive entanglement test.99The Supreme Court divided 5 to 4 in upholding a New York statute that allowed reimbursement to nonpublic schools that had paid for mandated testing
reporting services, but did so because the aid was very limited and
the statute provided for a workable system to ensure that the
granted funds were used for secular purposes.lW The Court
added: "under the relevant cases the outcome would likely be
different if there were no effective means for insuring that the cash
reimbursements would cover only secular services."lol
92. California Initiative, supra note 25, § 13.
93. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
94. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
95. Id. at 779-780.
96. Id. at 796-97.
97. Taylor, supra note 14, at 1074.
98. 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
99. Taylor, supra note 14, at 1078; L. TRIBE,
866 (1978).
100. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
101. Id. at 659.
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Under a voucher system, the amount of entanglement and administrative oversight would be great and would not necessarily be
limited to secular purposes. The flow of so much public money to
private schools would result in substantial reporting requirements
and governmental oversight. A voucher program such as the California Initiative may have difficulty in surviving either the primary
effect or excessive entanglement obstacles.lm
XI. Family Choice: Teachers, Unions and
Administrators

Perhaps the most intractable problem in bringing a voucher program to reality is the united opposition of all sectors of the educational establishment: teachers, administrators and unions. In the
words of Wilson Riles, Superintendent of Schools of California:
"California needs a voucher system like Jimmy Carter needs another brother."lo3
Perhaps the most rapid change in the structure of education in
the past twenty-five years has been the widespread unionization of
teachers.'" Coons and Sugarman admit that family choice will be
greatly resisted by educators, that-in the short run-the objectives of the "Luddite school" teachers and administrators cannot
be erased but moderated. They suggest that economic guarantees
will be the minimum necessary to diffuse the resistance of labor.'"
They believe that family choice will give individual teachers unprecedented control over the classr~oms.'~
This may be wishful
thinking, for when teachers had theoretical control over their
classrooms before unionization, they had less power and were at
the mercy of arbitrary administrators and local school boards.Im
They suggest that economic guarantees would be the minimum
necessary to diffuse the resistance of labor.Io8That too may be
overly optimistic. Certainly economic guarantees alone do not
102. Taylor, supra note 14, at 1082-83.
103. Dale Lane, School Voucher Plan Resurfaces to Strong Welcome, San Jose
Mercury, Feb. 16, 1979, at 16, col. Al.
104. See Gee, The Unionization of Mr. Chips: A Survey Analysis of Collective
Bargaining in the Public Schools, 15 WILLAMETTE
L. J. 367 (1979).
supra note 3, at 174.
105. COONS& SUGARMAN,
106. Id.
107. Gee, supra note 104, at 379.
supra, note 3, at 174.
108. COONS& SUGARMAN,
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protect other teachers' rights vis-a-vis administrators, students or
the community. Surely the family choice plan would bring a lessening of teacher authority and control. Coons and Sugarman believe
that teachers fear vouchers because of their concern for competiIt was this
tion rather than the fear of arbitrary action by parents.'@'
lack of power that introduced unionization in the first place.l1° It is
hard to visualize that teachers' unions are willing to give back
contractual rights once gained.
Coons and Sugarman recommend on a trial basis the relaxation
of certification control in public school^!^' Certification, like tenure
and unionization, has moved beyond its original purpose^."^
Reducing controls on certification will be greatly fought by organized teaching groups for many of the wrong reasons. Attempts to
apply credential criteria to private schools will be fiercely resisted
and provide another reason for them to opt out of the voucher
plan. Coons and Sugarman envision a long-term withering or
shrinking of tenure rights as teachers move from school to scho01."~
The family-choice plan ignores the fact that factors other than
teachers' competence, such as shifting demographic patterns, may
cause changes in a school's population or a school's popularity with
parents. Their suggestions for ways of lessening the trauma of
severance would do little to promote teachers' security.
With state monies flowing into private schools, they too will
become ripe for unionization. With the breakdown of the local
school district, union power may actually increase.l14The strength
of teachers' unions and teachers' own insecurity seem incompatible with a large-scale family choice program. Even if economic
security can be insured, the resulting inefficiencies might make the
family choice program substantially more expensive than present
educational systcixs.
assump:ioii that teachers, if they do iioi
like the school environment, could move from school to school
does not reflect the present educational market nor the ease of such
movement.
XII. Vouchers and the Future of Public Education

Despite this criticism of the California Initiative and the familychoice education plan, Coons and Sugarman are to be con109. Id. at 173.
110. Gee, supra note 104, at 379.
111. COONS
& SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 170.
112. Id. at 170-72.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 176.
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gratulated for providing serious, thoughtful alternatives to present
educational structures. Some of their critics have claimed that
voucher programs (and other support alternatives such as tuition
assistance to parents who send their children to other than public
schools)115signal the end of public education as it is now known.l16
This is overdrawn. Vouchers may drive out the most talented
students and leave some schools, particularly in urban and rural
areas, even more segregated and stratified than at present. The
critics have overestimated the political influence of voucher proponents. Other attempts besides Alum Rock to introduce vouchers have not been welcomed by the public. In 1974, New Hampshire proposed to commence a less regulated voucher experiment
than Alum Rock to assess public attitudes towards the voucher
concept. Unlike Alum Rock, the New Hampshire proposal included private nonsectarian schools in their second year of operation. No school district in the state was willing to participate. Four
districts overwhelmingly rejected the program by a vote of their
citizens.11'
Vouchers may be an idea in search of a constituency. In January
1976, an East Hartford, Connecticut, school district voted down its
proposed plan to experiment with vouchers after two years of
studying and planning.l18In 1978, a Michigan group, Citizens for a
More Sensible Financing of Education, placed a voucher proposal
on the November 1978general ballot. It called for the legislature to
provide an educational voucher to each child in attendance of
public and nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, the prohibition of property taxes by local and intermediate school districts
for any purpose other than retirement, and to establish a program
of general state taxation. The proposal was defeated by a 74 to 26
percent margin. llg
It is not surprising that despite such great dissatisfaction with
public schools, voters have been unwilling to overthrow the educational structure completely. When faced with a choice, voters do
-

115. A Tuition Tax Credit Initiative sponsored by the National Taxpayers
Union would provide a credit against state income tax of up to $1,200 for every
full-time student. See Taylor, supra note 14, at 1066. The Tuition Tax Relief Act
of 1981 S. 550,97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981), sponsored by Senators Packwood and
Moynihan, would provide a tax credit equal to 50% of a taxpayer's educational
expenses up to a maximum of $500 the first year, and $1,000 after July 31,1983.
116. Butts, Educational Vouchers: The Private Pursuit of the Public Purse, 61
PHIDELTA
KAPPAN7 (1979).
117. Tractenberg, supra note 78, at 160.
118. McGuire, supra note 2, at 9.
119. Id. at 11.
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recall the centrality of education in American life. A voucher
system would mark a return to a more atomized educational system of schooling reminiscent of the eighteenth century.'" Vouchers will change the public's perception of education, particularly
the central role of education in our political life.
Education is different. In an increasingly centralized society, the
loci of power have become ever more distant. Local school boards
are one of the few remaining ramparts of citizen democracy for all,
whether or not the constituents have children in public schools.
Even in large city school systems, the movement for decentralization of schools is a call to return to the traditional concept of
community control of schools. Family choice places the locus of
educational power into the hands of parents who may not have the
expertise to run schools, may not have roots in the community and
would operate apart from the political process. Education is too
important to be left to parents and educators alone. Even those
who have no children or have children in private schools have
important interests in and impact on public education. They are
affected by their local school system. Vouchers will disenfranchise
those without school children12'and will atomize the broad lobby in
favor of or interested in education.
The local property tax has been a source of inequality and
unfairness. Thanks in part to much of the earlier work by Professors Coons and Sugarman, the inequalities of taxing have been
remedied in many states. But the direct financial and political stake
of the public at large in public education is an important reason
why the present structure of education should not be completely
dismantled. To dismantle the present educational structure would
make education, particularly public education, just another social
welfare prnornm
-e- ---' Not a! citizecs .xi!! hal~p,2 stake i: public e&ca.
tion and support for it will decline.
Yet, voucher ideas should not be rejected out of hand. It may be
time to work within the present structure of education for reform.
Schools themselves are focusing more on essentials. Attempts at
integration seem ended for the time being. Schools are returning to
educating the student. Within this context more experimentation
involving vouchers is needed. Vouchers provide a particularly
useful way to supplement educational opportunities using the tra120. CREMIN,
supra note 50, at 400-404, 501-509, 544-46.
121. LaNoue, supra note 58, at 319.
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ditional structure of education. Many of the advantages attributed
to vouchers could be used more efficiently and be put to better use
within the present educational structure. Sugarman has suggested
the idea of school stamps to apply in a variety of ways to supplement educational experience.lZ2Now is certainly not the time to
begin anew.

122. Sugarman, Education Reform at the Margin: Two Ideas, 59 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN154 (1977).
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